Both LBJ and Mr. Blair decided to defy their base and proceed to send in more troops. In both cases, they became a pariah with their political bases on the political left which supported both men in their quest for office, LBJ in 1964 and Tony Blair in 1997. For Blair, the Liberal Democratic Party became vociferous in their opposition to his policies and many left-leaning members of Blair’s Labor Party abandoned their support of him.

In the case of LBJ, Eugene McCarthy (D-MI) came within six points of defeating him in the Democratic primary in New Hampshire in 1968. The disenchanted left of the Democratic Party supported McCarthy. LBJ dropped out of the race. His Vice President, Hubert Humphrey lost the general election in part because many McCarthy supporters would not support him in the general election. Ironically, on domestic policy LBJ was probably the most liberal President in American history.

As for the actual war, I call this: “Omar’s War.” The reason we are in there is because of the decision of one man, Mullah Mohamed Omar, leader of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan made. He refused abrogate Osama bin Laden or his al-qaeda coefficients who were staying in Afghanistan. This is what precipitated NATO into allying with the Northern Alliance and invading the country.

The problem is that we are focusing much time on rebuilding Afghanistan rather than trying to hunt down Omar’s guest, bin Laden. We have been diverted from what should be our real goal. Al-Qaeda is not loyal specifically to Afghanistan. Rather it is a transnational movement which can metastasize itself in a multiplicity of nations. Accordingly, I often wonder if this is kind of a cat and mouse game. If we chase out the branch that is in Afghanistan or for that matter, Pakistan, will they just join move into another country. It seems to me that the war should be defined as the War on Al-Qaeda, not the country that elements of the organization are staying in.

Unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, they are not a nationalist movement but a transnational organization. I think we should try to buy off the economic Taliban. We did this in Iraq with what we call the “Sunni Awakening” by bringing many low-level Sunni insurgents to our side.

I think that a lot of the Taliban fighters, like many Sunni fighters in Iraq defend the Taliban not for theological or political reasons. They join the Taliban simply because they get they get paid.

If we are to succeed in effectuated a stable government in that nation and succeed in jettisoning the estimated 100 al-qaeda members in that country, will that make a dent in the war with al-qaeda? Lets say that they do not reconstitute themselves in Afghanistan and the Taliban does not re-take control, will we truly be safe from al-qaeda? They are a supranational coterie not loyal to a nation. If we create an inhospitable environment for them in Afghanistan, what about Somalia, Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, etc.? We are fighting a non-state actor. How do we defeat a non-state actor by creating stable governments and nations? They are not a nation state. I think we should, o launch some kind of a search-and-destroy mission against the al-qaeda elements in each nation? Or how about if the international community were to pay private detectives and other law-enforcement officials to find and capture al-qaeda. My point is that a win in Afghanistan is a pyrrhic victory. By bogging ourselves in one nation, we are just allowing al-qaeda to constitute and expand elsewhere?